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Trump’s Travel Bans 
Harvesting personal data 
and requiem for the EU-US Privacy Shield 
Elspeth Guild, Didier Bigo and Sergio Carrera 
Summary 
This Policy Insight examines the main implications and challenges of the recent Executive Orders or ‘travel bans’ 
issued by US President Donald Trump. It argues that one of the key ulterior motives behind these orders is to 
manoeuvre the US into an advantageous position for harvesting personal data on individuals from around the 
world, including EU citizens and residents. The paper analyses these orders and other recent US legislative 
developments that allow for greater access and processing of raw communications of EU citizens, and argues that 
they put the sustainability of the EU-US Privacy Shield and the EU right to privacy under profound strain. The 
authors call for more diplomacy and democratic rule of law with fundamental rights guarantees and cooperation, 
as the most effective antidote to the pervasive mistrust and legal uncertainty engendered by these Executive 
Orders. In any case these developments call for the European Commission to take an assertive position and 
suspend the EU-US Privacy Shield, as this is the only way to ensure legal certainty for companies, citizens and 
authorities in the EU. This would also send a clear signal to the US about the absolute need to take into account 
the conflicts of law challenges that these orders pose for the EU and member states' data protection legal systems. 
The paper also recommends re-designing and strengthening the current EU-US Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue 
between the European Parliament and its US counterparts to better allow for a closer consultation on relevant US 
and EU policies with deep repercussions on transatlantic relations and citizens across the board. 
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Elspeth Guild, Didier Bigo and Sergio Carrera 
1. Introduction 
On 27 January 2017, the US President issued an Executive Order entitled “Protecting the nation 
from foreign terrorists’ entry into the United States”,1 suspending admission to the US of 
nationals from seven countries – Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen – for a 90-
day period. In addition, the order suspended the US Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days 
and placed a cap on the number of arrivals permitted in the fiscal year 2017. In another 
important move, the order requires the Department of Homeland Security together with the 
Attorney General to collect and publish, every 180 days, statistics on the number of foreign 
nationals charged with terrorism-related offences (or radicalised). The first travel ban also 
included a number of other grounds, which were removed from the second version. 
The implementation of the Executive Order immediately resulted in substantial chaos in the 
travel industry, as companies scrambled to align their practices to the new reality of ‘non-
admission’. It also sparked controversy in many parts of the country owing to the questionable 
legality of separating families and the constitutionality of the order itself. Several legal 
challenges were successfully waged in US trial courts, leading to a decision by the Court of 
Appeals for the 9th Circuit on February 9th, which upheld the original decisions and refused to 
reverse the lower courts. The first plaintiffs in the matter were two states: Washington and 
Minnesota.  
On March 6th, the US President issued a new Executive Order,2 this time barring entry into the 
US by nationals of these same countries except Iraq (a fact we will come back to shortly). Like 
its predecessor, the new order suspended the refugee programme and ordered the collection 
of statistics on foreign offenders, but this time the argumentation for the selection of the six 
countries was (marginally) more sophisticated. A judge in Hawaii has already suspended the 
new Executive Order and at the time of writing it is not clear how far the US Government will 
appeal the matter.3 
2. What ulterior motives lie behind the Executive Orders?  
Despite the very considerable media coverage of the impact, effects and fate of the Executive 
Orders, there has been surprisingly little said about the core objective of the orders. It appears 
                                                        
1 The White House, Office of Press Department, Executive Order ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into the United States’, 27 January 2017 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office 
/2017/01/27/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states).  
2 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 6 March 2017 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states).  
3 “Hawaii Judge Extends Order Blocking Trump’s Travel Ban”, New York Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/us/politics/travel-ban-trump-judge-hawaii.html  
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that use of the term “Muslim ban” with its focus on religious identity has successfully distracted 
attention from the underlying objective of the order, namely to harvest personal data on 
foreigners. In fact, any country refusing to deliver personal data of their citizens travelling to 
the US could be added to the list. Therefore, the objective is not to combat states that sponsor 
terrorism, but to harvest personal data on individuals from around the world, which could be 
used by US intelligence agencies in ways that may go beyond the struggle against terrorism.4 
Section 3 of the January 27th order and Section 2 of the March 6th order are substantially the 
same. They state the purpose of the Executive Order and what the President seeks by these 
dramatic actions. The purpose is simple: to require foreign countries to provide information 
about their citizens as requested by the US authorities for adjudicating an application by the 
person for a visa, admission or other benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
Specifically, it is to determine whether the presence of an alien in the country or area increases 
the likelihood that the alien is a credible threat to the national security of the United States.  
It is not specified what information that may be, but it is information that is additional to what 
is already available to the US authorities. The purpose of the adjudication is to determine that 
the person is not a security or public-safety threat. The objective is to assess the credibility of 
the alien not on the basis of his or her actions, but through a correlation of travel undertaken 
by the individual and a profile generated by an algorithm, which the US authorities call a “threat 
assessment”.  
What this means is that the individual becomes a part of a class of persons with whom he or 
she has no connection at all except one determined by the algorithm. There is no question of a 
presumption of innocent behaviour here but rather the production of an algorithm of suspicion 
accumulating in different watch lists the number of persons to flag or to refuse entry at the 
borders, as subjects who are “potentially dangerous” and almost guilty by association without 
any authoritative causality. The section in addition permits the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to require certain information from particular countries about their nationals but not from 
others (no equality among countries is required).  
Nowhere in the Executive Order is it made clear what information the US authorities want 
states to submit to them about their own citizens. We know, however, that the US Congress 
amended the Visa Waiver Program on 18 December 2015 (under the Obama Presidency) and 
required all travellers of Visa Waiver Program countries (which includes most EU citizens) 
travelling to the US after 21 January 2016 who had been present in Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, 
                                                        
4 Edward Snowden’s revelations on the US intelligence-led PRISM Programme in 2013 provided evidence of large-
scale electronic surveillance that went far beyond the struggle against terrorism purposes by the US National 
Security Agency (NSA) into the world’s largest electronic communications companies. See D. Bigo et al., “Open 
Season for Data Fishing in the Web: The Challenges of the US PRISM Programme for the EU”, CEPS Policy Brief, 
CEPS, Brussels, June 2013; see also D. Bigo et al., “Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and 
its Compatibility with EU Law”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, CEPS, Brussels, November 2013.  
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Syria, Sudan or Yemen at any time on or after 1 March 2011 to obtain a visa before travelling 
to the US.5 The Commission also noted this change in its report on visa reciprocity in April 2016.6  
Perhaps some of the additional information that the US authorities seek relates to the travel 
activities of other countries’ citizens, but it is not evident that states are fully aware of their 
citizens’ travel histories. Governments may become aware of where their citizens have been in 
the process of renewing or replacing their passports, but this is not always the case. Only travel 
agencies and airlines through their shared passenger name record (PNR) systems have solid 
evidence of where people have travelled. According to experts, there are only three major 
companies that process and store PNR: Amadeus, Sabre and Travelport (the latter consisting 
essentially of Worldspan and Galileo, both of which are part of Travelport but with separate 
operations).7 Amadeus is based in Spain, and the other two are US companies.  
Perhaps the US seeks to put in place a similar kind of cooperation with other countries that its 
authorities have established under a 2013 agreement between the UK, Northern Ireland and 
the US,8 in which the UK shares data on all persons (except US nationals) seeking authorisation 
to transit through, travel to, work in the UK or take up UK citizenship, including all data 
(personal, statistical or both) related to admissibility, immigration and nationality compliance 
actions. Via an exchange of notes on 29 September 2016,9 the scope of the agreement was 
enlarged to include British citizens (EU citizens had already been included in the original 2013 
agreement).  
While citizens generally are not required to provide much in the way of documentation other 
than a passport to enter their own state, they may have to provide substantial amounts of 
personal data to sponsor third-country national family members or visitors. This information is 
also now freely available to the US authorities (on a reciprocal basis of course). But the US only 
has two such agreements in force: with Canada and the UK. Although in principle such 
agreements were to be concluded between the so-called ‘Five Eyes countries’ (Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US), no agreement with the latter two countries has been 
reached (yet). It may simply be that the US has decided that negotiating such agreements 
requires too much time and has the disadvantage of requiring reciprocity, prompting the 
authorities to seek a more coercive way to encourage the ‘sharing’ of personal data. 
                                                        
5 Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 
(https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr158/summary) accessed 17 March 2017. 
6 European Commission, Communication on the “State of play and the possible ways forward as regards the 
situation of non-reciprocity with certain third countries in the area of visa policy”, COM(2016)221, 12 April 
2016. 
7 Edward Hasbrouck, “What's in a Passenger Name Record (PNR)?”, The Practical Nomad 
(https://hasbrouck.org/articles/PNR.html) accessed 17 March 2017. 
8 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the United States of America for the Sharing of Visa, Immigration, and Nationality Information, 18 
April 2013. 
9 Treaty Series No. 35 (2016). 
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Given that the objective of the first and second Executive Orders was to encourage states to 
provide the US with personal data about their citizens, were they successful? It seems so, at 
least with the weakest states. Between the first and the second Executive Order, the Iraqi 
government took steps to enhance travel documentation, information sharing and the return 
of Iraqi nationals subject to removal orders from the US (section 1(g) Executive Order, 6 March 
2017). This would seem to indicate that the threat of a blanket US travel ban based on 
citizenship has had the desired effect of convincing the Iraqi authorities to share more personal 
data about their citizens with the US. The order has not specified what new, additional 
information is now being shared that had not been previously available.  
3. Harvesting data vs. conflicts of law: The EU’s specificity on privacy  
Both the first and second Executive Orders provide that the governments of the countries 
whose nationals are subject to these bans will be requested to provide information within 60 
days of notification or be subject to an extension of the ban (Section 2(d)). Furthermore, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of 
National Intelligence will conduct a worldwide review to identify what additional information is 
needed from each country in order to determine that its citizens are not a security or public-
safety threat (Section 2(a)). Failure to provide the information results in inclusion in the list of 
countries whose citizens are banned from entry to the US (Section 2). At any time the President 
can add more countries to the list (Section 2(f)).  
There is no consideration in the Executive Orders of the consequences for the targeted 
countries of revealing personal data about their citizens to a foreign state. The assumption is 
that if the law of a country or jurisdiction presents an obstacle to personal data sharing, it is for 
the country concerned to amend the law or accept a no-entry ban for its citizens to the US. This 
poses substantial conflicts of law with the European Union, which has put in place a solid data 
protection and privacy legal framework.  
In addition to the 2016 general data protection Regulation 2016/679 and the data protection 
Directive for police and criminal justice authorities 2016/680,10 the Court of Justice of the EU 
has handed down a series of landmark judgments requiring the European institutions and 
member states to refrain from permitting the transfer of personal data to third countries except 
those in compliance with EU privacy standards.11 In brief, the main EU rules on data protection 
require the following legal standards to be effectively protected: 
                                                        
10 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1; Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89. 
11 Refer to C‑362/14 Schrems, 6 October 2015. 
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1. clear limitation on the use of data to the purpose for which it has been collected (purpose 
limitation principle); 
2. time limits on retention of data consistent with the purpose; 
3. deletion of personal data as soon as they are no longer needed; 
4. limitation on access to data only to those specifically authorised; 
5. prohibition on onward transfer and use unless specifically authorised; and 
6. entitlement of the subject to verify, correct and delete his or her personal data; and 
7. right to effective remedies and judicial redress. 
In the 2015 Schrems case, the Court of Justice concluded that access on a generalised basis to 
electronic communications is tantamount to compromising the essence of the EU fundamental 
right to respect for private life laid down in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.12 This 
effectively means that mass or bulk surveillance of EU citizens is not consistent with EU data 
protection rules as well as the legal principles of proportionality and necessity. The Luxembourg 
Court held that access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications is 
tantamount to profoundly compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for 
private life.13 The Court also found that ensuring access to effective remedies and independent 
judicial review of the derogations or interference by state and national security authorities in 
the rights of privacy and data protection in the name of national security constitute key 
conditions for ensuring the rule of law.14 
4. Requiem for the EU-US Privacy Shield? 
Access to EU citizens’ personal data has been a subject of much discussion in the context of the 
EU-US transatlantic data flows by commercial enterprises. The protection of EU fundamental 
rights of the data subject has been an immensely controversial and complex matter in light of 
the US insistence that personal data belong to the agency or entity that collected them rather 
than the data subject and the continued practice of bulk surveillance.  
Following the invalidation by the Court of Justice of the EU in the previous Safe Harbour 
decision in the above-mentioned Schrems Case C-362/14 in October 2015, a rather convoluted 
solution was found to accommodate the differences in position taken by the EU and the US and 
enable companies to send personal data between the EU and the US, in the form of the so-
called EU-US Privacy Shield.15  
                                                        
12 For an analysis see S. Carrera and E. Guild (2015), Safe Harbour or into the Storm? EU-US Data Transfers after 
the Schrems Judgment, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe Papers, Brussels, November 2015. 
13 Refer to paragraph paragraphs 94 and 95 of the judgment. 
14 Paragraph 95 of the Schrems judgement.  
15 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2461_en.htm See also European Commission, Communication 
Transatlantic Data Flows: Restoring Trust through Strong Safeguards, COM(2016) 117 final, 29.2.2016. 
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Since its adoption in July 2016, the legality and adequacy of the EU-US Privacy Shield in 
protecting EU personal data legal standards have been called into question.16 The adoption on 
the 3 January 2017 of yet another Executive Order 12333 by the US Attorney General on 
“Procedures for the availability or dissemination of raw signals intelligence information by the 
National Security Agency under Section 2.3” has put the sustainability of the Privacy Shield and 
the EU right to privacy under further strain.17 The Executive Order basically gives the US NSA 
even-greater access to and processing of raw data and communications of EU citizens and 
residents without any clear or effective democratic supervision, judicial guarantees and 
effective remedies.  
This Executive Order moves US security practices yet further away from EU data protection 
rules, and, when combined with the Executive Order “Protecting the nation from foreign 
terrorists’ entry into the United States”, the resulting cocktail is highly explosive. Consequently, 
the ‘adequacy decision’ that the European Commission conducts regarding the legality of 
transfer of data between commercial organisations from the EU to the US (in particular the 
extent to which the level of protection of the right to privacy and data protection in the US is 
essentially equivalent to that in the EU) is bound to fall apart.  
All these Executive Orders constitute evidence that the US is effectively non-compliant with the 
Privacy Shield. A similar conclusion has been reached by the European Parliament. In a Motion 
for a Resolution adopted March 29th, the Parliament expressed deep concern about these 
developments in the US and called upon the European Commission to independently and 
transparently examine the compatibility of these new US orders and practices with the 
commitments by the EU under the Privacy Shield.18  
The Parliament is also calling upon the Commission to re-consider its current 2016 Decision 
about the adequacy, effectiveness and feasibility of the privacy and data protection granted by 
the US in the upcoming first joint annual review of the Privacy Shield,19 particularly in the 
context of law enforcement activities and national security authorities. The Parliament also 
reminded EU data protection authorities (DPAs) to closely monitor these latest developments 
and effectively exercise their envisaged powers, including the possibility to temporarily 
suspend or permanently ban personal data transfers to the US. 
                                                        
16 See for instance http://www.alstonprivacy.com/eu-u-s-privacy-shield-faces-judicial-attack/ accessed 30 March 
2017. For an overview of the Privacy Shield Programme, visit https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview  
17 The full text of this Executive Order is available in the New York Times article “N.S.A. Gets More Latitude to Share 
Intercepted Communications”, 12 January 2017 (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/us/politics/nsa-gets-
more-latitude-to-share-intercepted-communications.html).  
18 European Parliament, Motion for a Resolution, on the adequacy of the protection afforded by the EU-US Privacy 
Shield (2016/3018(RSP), 29 March 2017 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type= 
MOTION&reference=B8-2017-0235&format=XML&language=EN).  
19 European Commission, Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield, C(2016) 4176, OJ L 207/1, 1.8.2016. 
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5. Conclusions and recommendations  
The US approach in the March 6th Executive Order appears designed to require states to provide 
personal data about their citizens to the US or to face blanket travel bans against their citizens 
entering the US. This means that any concerns that states may have about the protection of 
the personal data of their citizens are by and large overridden. The negotiation of an agreement 
with the US that seeks to satisfy these requirements, such as the EU-US Privacy Shield, is no 
longer the US model. Instead, access (or denial) to US territory is the sweetener (or the threat) 
that is being used to extract personal data from states about their citizens. 
As the European Commissioner has recently stated: "The commitments the US has taken must 
be respected."20 EU-US transatlantic data transfers can only happen under effective rule of law 
and fundamental rights protection. The Commission should seek written clarification by US 
authorities about the intention and impact of all these recent US Executive Orders and closely 
engage the European Parliament in the follow-up process. The evidence on inadequacy of 
protection in the US cannot be more solid. A Commission decision suspending the EU-US 
Privacy Shield would be an inevitable and welcome step forward in ensuring more legal 
certainty for companies, citizens and authorities in the EU. 
A clear message that emerges from this recent phase in transatlantic relations is that such 
unilateral actions exclude the possibility of diplomacy and prevent a balanced weighing of 
different perspectives, costs and interests, which have served the EU and the US well in their 
post-war relations. The US Executive Orders examined in this paper reveal, however, an 
astonishing absence of consultation with the relevant actors affected by these decisions, chiefly 
the authorities of other states and supranational organisations such as the EU, but also the 
private sector, all of which have legitimate and critical interests in these matters. More mistrust 
has inevitably followed. This calls for more diplomacy and democratic rule of law with 
fundamental rights guarantees and cooperation, as the most effective antidote.  
One specific way to move forward would be for the European Parliament to boost and further 
strengthen existing efforts under the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue21 in an attempt to 
reinforce regular and structured inter-parliamentary dialogue with relevant counterparts in the 
US House of Representatives and Senate. This could constitute a new framework for 
democratic scrutiny promoting closer cooperation and consultation on relevant US and EU legal 
and policy developments, which, like the recent US Executive Orders, have profound 
repercussions on transatlantic relations covering not only Justice and Home Affairs but also 
policies and citizens across the board. 
                                                        
20 “EU trying to salvage US deal on data privacy”, EUobserver, 30 March 2017 
(https://euobserver.com/justice/137438). See also “Trump's anti-privacy order stirs EU angst”, EUobserver, 27 
January 2017 (https://euobserver.com/justice/136699).  
21 For more information on the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue, see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/tld/default_en.htm  
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